When managing heterogeneous socioecological systems, decision-makers must choose a spatial resolution at which to define management policies. Complex spatial policies allow managers to better reflect underlying ecological and economic heterogeneity, but incur higher compliance and enforcement costs. To choose the most appropriate management resolution, we need to characterize the relationship between management resolution and performance. We parameterize a model of the commercial coral trout fishery in the Great Barrier Reef, Australia, which is currently managed by a single, spatially homogeneous management policy. We use this model to estimate how the spatial resolution of management policies affect the amount of revenue generated, and assess whether a more spatially complex policy can be justified. Our results suggest that economic variation is likely to be a more important source of heterogeneity than ecological differences, and that the majority of this variation can be captured by a relatively simple spatial management policy. Moreover, while an increase in policy resolution can improve performance, the location of policy changes also needs to align with ecological and socioeconomic variation. Interestingly, the highly complex process of larval dispersal, which plays a critical ecological role in coral reef ecosystem dynamics, may not demand equally complex management policies.
Introduction
Ecological systems are characterized by rich patterns of variability over multiple spatial scales [1, 2] . These patterns arise from many interwoven spatial processes: different species perceive and respond to the environment over different scales [3] ; individuals interact directly with their neighbours as competitors, predators or mutualists [4] ; and populations and communities are linked by dispersal [5] and ecosystems through nutrient flows [6] . In managed ecosystems, additional heterogeneity is imposed by spatial patterns in the ways that humans interact with ecosystems. For example, through variability in the distribution of harvesting effort [7] , spatial autocorrelation in habitat destruction [8] or the complementary siting of conservation and restoration projects [9] . When confronted with highly heterogeneous socioecological systems, managers must decide how much of that variability should be reflected in their policy prescriptions [10, 11] . On the one hand, resolving variability ever more finely will improve policy outcomes; on the other hand, complicated policies increase administrative and compliance costs [12] . Thus, when weighing up both the benefits and costs of more complex policies, it may not always be desirable to move to higher resolution management. In this paper, we characterize the potential performance gains that result from managing a multi-scale socioecological system at a range of different resolutions, using a commercial fishery within the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage area (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, or GBRMP) as a case study.
The managed exploitation of reef fishes exemplifies the importance of scale in ecosystem management, as policy-makers are faced with ecological dynamics that vary at a multitude of spatial scales. Reef fish population dynamics are shaped by heterogeneity over scales that range from metres to thousands of kilometers [13] . The harvesting of reef fish species is also spatially variable, reflecting travel costs, local densities and market access [14] [15] [16] . In this paper, we focus on interactions that play out on scales ranging from individual patch reefs (hectares) to the entire GBRMP (containing 1794 modelled patch populations across 2000 km). We focus on fisheries management policies that affect the pattern of exploitation on a targeted population; in some fisheries, these are implemented through local catch quotas, and in some through spatial restrictions on fishing effort (e.g. licences, marine reserves). Because of the ecological and socioeconomic heterogeneity inherent in fisheries, management outcomes can be improved by constraining the spatial distribution of fishing effort [16] . Indeed, some ecological models assume policymakers can vary quotas or restrictions on effort over very short distances to exploit such gains [17] [18] [19] . However, the spatial resolution of real-world policies contrast starkly with such prescriptions, with policies generally being applied uniformly over large spatial domains [20] [21] [22] . In this paper, we explore potential efficiency gains from reducing the size of spatial domains within which uniform policies are applied. We refer to this throughout as varying the spatial resolution of the relevant policy. Importantly, while a policy prescription (e.g. an overall quota level, price of fishing permits) may be spatially uniform within some domain, the spatial impact of fishing may not be, because fishers will respond to the policy by allocating their harvesting effort in spatially heterogeneous ways.
Dispersal is one of the most important ecological processes shaping patterns of variability in spatially distributed populations. Often dispersal is thought of as having a smoothing effect-reducing spatial heterogeneity and thereby lowering the potential gains from high-resolution policy prescriptions. However, when dispersal is asymmetric, spatial ecological heterogeneity can be exacerbated rather than reduced [5, 23, 24] . Moreover, dispersal between different locations can create additional management complexities. Specifically, management actions taken in one location can have cascading implications in other management locations (i.e. dispersal can create externalities). Spatial management solutions can account for these spatial interactions [25] , but to do so perfectly would require management to vary at the same resolution as dispersal (i.e. from reef-to-reef). The spatial resolution of management is therefore an important question for reef fish populations, where dispersal plays a central ecological role [26, 27] . In these species, adults tend to be associated with particular benthic habitats that are patchily distributed. However, almost all species undergo a pelagic larval stage, during which eggs or larvae disperse through open water for weeks or months before recruiting to, occasionally quite distant, benthic habitats for subsequent life stages [28] . Pelagic larval dispersal of this type creates demographically crucial connectivity between different patch populations [29, 30] . The resulting dispersal patterns are shaped by the interplay of oceanographic currents and the behaviour of spawning adults and dispersing larvae [31, 32] , introducing additional high-resolution complexity that may benefit from commensurately complex management policies.
In this paper, we examine how increasing the spatial resolution of fishery management policies improves the performance of these fisheries. To do this, we use a parameterized metapopulation model for a commercially exploited fish species on the GBRMP. Because of its importance for reef fish population dynamics, we are particularly interested in understanding how heterogeneous dispersal affects the performance of low-resolution management policies-the interplay between the scale of management policy and the scale of larval dispersal. Therefore, we test how our conclusions would be changed by different models of larval connectivity.
Material and methods
We base our analyses on a bioeconomic model parametrized for the coral trout (Plectropomus leopardus) line fishery within the GBRMP. This model combines a spatially explicit population model with an economic model describing the distribution of fishing effort. We examine a regulator's attempt to maximize income from the fishery through the sale of licences, defined at different spatial resolutions. Each of these model components is internally complex, and we therefore briefly describe each component of the model in the sections that follow, and provide full details in the electronic supplementary material.
The structure of our model aims to clearly incorporate ecological and economic factors that vary at multiple scales, and the model is parameterized to recreate observed patterns of fishing effort in the GBRMP. However, we do not seek to undertake a full stock assessment, and our results concerning the size of the fish population, the distribution of fishing effort, and the potential magnitude of the revenue available to the regulator are therefore best viewed as indicative and relative, rather than predictive and absolute. More accurate models for the coral trout fishery can be found in the recent stock assessment [14] , and in the Effects of Line Fishing Project [33, 34] .
(a) Ecological model
The ecological model predicts the abundance of coral trout in 1794 local populations associated with individual reefs (figure 1; individual reefs are defined by spatially contiguous shallow water habitat and may differ from GBRMP definitions). Local populations are joined into a metapopulation through dispersal during the larval phase. Larvae are spawned on each reef, and settle back upon the reefs following a pelagic dispersal stage. Dispersal trajectories are modelled using a biophysical simulation, parametrized for the GBRMP. The model includes reasonable assumptions about larval pre-competent/competent period, and swimming and sensory capabilities that broadly match those of P. leopardus [31, 35] . Dispersal patterns were generated using observed hydrodynamic conditions between 1996 and 2002, and we used the average across these years to simulate the destinations of larvae from each source population. Population dynamics following arrival at a reef assume compensatory density-dependent survival at settlement, density-independent and size-dependent adult growth, natural mortality and fecundity, protogynous hermaphrodism, and age-structured fishing mortality through a minimum size limit [14, 33] . See the electronic supplementary material, Methods 1 for details of the population dynamic model.
(b) Fishing model
The fishing model predicts the distribution of fishing effort applied to each reef in the system. Because each vessel is free to fish anywhere in the system, more profitable reefs will attract more fishing effort than less profitable reefs. Here we assume the simplest version of this dynamic in which the distribution of fishing effort equalizes the net profits per trip [36, 37] . Net profit is determined by the biomass caught, the price of fish, the costs of applying fishing effort (e.g. for bait, labour), the travel costs to reach different reefs, and the price of buying a fishing licence, where licence prices are set by the regulator. The catch per unit effort in each location is determined by the coupled rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 283: 20152828 dynamics of the fishery and the fish metapopulation. We assume that vessels are docked at one of nine major ports for this fishery along the Queensland coast (identified as major commercial fishery ports by the most recent stock assessment; [14, 38] ; figure 3). While there is a cost to enter the fishery (the licence price), we assume access is not limited in other ways, meaning that at equilibrium the amount and distribution of fishing will drive supernormal profits (i.e. profits available over and above investing time or money in other parts of the economy) to zero on every reef [36, 37, 39] . At this point, the marginal profitability of increased fishing effort on each reef is equal to the price of the licence on that reef.
Even with our very simple assumptions, the model predicts a spatial distribution of effort broadly matching patterns observed in the line fishery (electronic supplementary material, figure S1 ; [40] ). Predicted and observed effort levels peak offshore of Mackay, Townsville and Gladstone, but decline further north, reflecting the strong influence of travel costs and lack of ports in the far north of Queensland. While travel costs predict a large proportion of the variance in fishing effort at each reef, the ecological characteristics of the reef-particularly its connectivity to the rest of the metapopulation-add a large amount of variation to this pattern (electronic supplementary material, figure S1 ). See the electronic supplementary material, Methods 2 for details of the fishery model.
(c) Regulator's decision
We assume that the objective of the regulator is to maximize the amount of revenue flowing to the public from the fishery. The regulator does this by choosing a licence price to charge for every unit of fishing effort on different reefs. This approach differs from the current management of the GBRMP coral trout fishery, where effort is controlled by a single total allowable catch (TAC), distributed as individual transferable quota. However, there is a symmetry between the two management models, since a single TAC defines a unique (single) licence price assuming fishing effort is restricted, and a unique licence price will restrict effort and will result in a particular total catch. Thus, for each policy resolution, we could in principle choose a set of licence prices that yielded 3061 tonnes of catch, the rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 283: 20152828 current TAC, although we actually optimize over the licence prices being set to generate our results. If the regulator sets the price for a reef too high, few licences will be purchased, but if they set the price too low, the revenue gathered will be small. The optimal licence price balances these countervailing forces. More productive reefs (e.g. reefs which receive a large amount of larval recruitment) will support larger populations, and the licences for these reefs can therefore be more expensive. Throughout these analyses, we assume that the regulator chooses spatially contiguous licence regions, and sets the licence price to be the same for any reef within each region. The size and number of licence regions therefore determine the resolution of the management policy.
In our model, the regulator therefore makes the first decision by choosing the number and location of the licence regions, and setting a licence price in each. The fishers then distribute their fishing effort to maximize their profits given these licences, and the population dynamics for coral trout respond to this fishing effort. We focus on long-run equilibrium outcomes both for the fishery and the coral trout population. We then employ optimization tools to represent the decisions of a regulator whose goal is to maximize revenue. See the electronic supplementary material, Methods 3 for details of the regulator model.
(d) Analyses
To examine how the spatial resolution of policies affects management performance, we allow the regulator to set licence prices that vary between different contiguous regions. Within each region, the licence price is assumed constant and, having purchased a licence to fish there, vessels are free to target any reef within that region. To increase the resolution of the policy, we increase the number of licence regions, each of which then has a smaller average size.
Specifically, we focus on seven different regional divisions of the GBRMP (figure 1). These vary in spatial resolution from treating the whole GBRMP as a single spatial unit, through to splitting it into 30 different zones. We also consider two benchmarks. First, the hypothetical situation that would lead to the greatest possible revenue-where the regulator sets a separate licence price for every reef in the system. We refer to this as the 'first best' regulatory solution [25] . Second, the unconstrained, open access situation, where the licence prices is set to zero on all reefs. This describes the state of the fishery without regulation, and with zero revenue being collected by the managers. Six of these policies were chosen because their boundaries are used administratively for existing regulatory programmes (electronic supplementary material, table S1). We also considered two alternative policies to illustrate two of our conclusions. First, we analysed a two region policy where the boundary location could be chosen freely, to maximize fishing revenue. Second, we analysed a six region policy where the boundary locations were nested within the four region solution (i.e. we split licence regions in the four region policy).
We are particularly interested in whether complex larval dispersal patterns drive the superior performance of high-resolution management policies. We thus calculate the relationship between policy resolution and performance under three different, increasingly spatially homogeneous, assumptions about larval dispersal. First, we use our detailed biophysical model of dispersal; second, we assume that dispersal is driven only by inter-reef distance, based on a Gaussian dispersal kernel [24] and third, we assume that there was no inter-reef dispersal (i.e. each reef is entirely self-recruiting). To ensure comparability across the three different cases, we alter the average strength of dispersal in the Gaussian and self-recruiting scenarios to ensure that the total biomass of coral trout at the unharvested equilibrium is equal to the biophysical scenario. We parametrize the Gaussian kernel based on the biophysical model of dispersal [41] .
Results
Higher resolution policies allow the regulator to better adapt management to variation in the ecosystem, and should thereby increase total revenue. By and large, this is what we observe: as the number of licence price regions increases, the overall revenue captured from the fishery also increases ( figure 1, centre panel) . This increase is broadly characterized by diminishing returns (approximately linear on a log-log scale), with the gains from increasingly complex spatial policies quickly diminishing as the number of licence price regions increases. That being said, the performance of the first best management policy (in which the regulator controls the amount of effort on every reef individually by setting 1794 reef-specific licence prices; open circle, figure 1) makes clear that improvements are still possible.
Under first best management, the optimal policy is driven by variability at two scales (figure 2). At the broadest scale, licence prices are set to zero over large, contiguous regions in the southern, and particularly in the northern GBRMP, despite the flexibility available to managers. This scale of variation is driven by economic variation, as travel costs make fishing in these most distant reefs prohibitive. By contrast, first best licence prices in the central section vary at the highest allowable resolution, responding primarily to ecological variation in dispersal patterns, and the density and size of the reefs. As the resolution of management decreases (moving to the left in figure 2) , the licence price set in each region is approximately the average of the first best licence price on its component reefs. Those policies that allow the most variation in the central section-where first best licence prices are high and variable-deliver superior performance. By contrast, policies that group together reefs with very different first best licence prices (e.g. the northern half of the GBRMP) deliver lower revenue than might be expected from the number of different licence regions.
By looking in more detail at specific locations, it becomes clear how more finely resolved licence price regions allow the regulator to resolve heterogeneity, and why this yields higher table S2 illustrates the attributes of these two reefs under the biophysical and self-recruiting dispersal scenarios, and three different optimal spatial licence resolutions: a single licence for the whole GBRMP, 30 bioregional licences and the first best solution. The self-recruiting dispersal scenario is the easier to interpret, since heterogeneity in this scenario is created by travel costs alone. The two reefs in this bioregion are overfished when only a single licence price applies to the whole GBRMP, reflected by their low biomass. These reefs are extremely close to ports, and so the GBRwide licence price undervalues them, encouraging overfishing. As the licence price becomes more spatially resolved this undervaluation is corrected, first by a 20% increase when the licence price is set for these two reefs as a single region, and then by less than 1% when a slightly lower licence price is set for the reef further from port, to encourage additional effort. When the price is chosen for multiple reefs simultaneously it is effectively a weighted average of the first best licence prices for those reefs. When dispersal exists between reefs, licence price changes become interdependent, and changes are therefore harder to explain. The correct licence price for each reef will still depend on the distance to the nearest port, but it will also reflect the amount of subsidy that the reef delivers to surrounding reefs, and the amount of settlement it receives from other reefs. The optimal licence price will be higher to protect larger and more important sources, and lower on sink reefs to encourage harvesting. Thus, an increasingly resolved licence price may result in lower local management revenues (i.e. on sources), if this allows for comparatively higher revenues elsewhere in the system. This dynamic can be seen in the biophysical licence prices in the electronic supplementary material, table S2, in the change from a single GBRMP licence price to a bioregional licence price. Although the revenue gathered from these two reefs decreases by 4%, the aggregate revenue across the fishery increases by 2%.
While the trends in figure 1 and the specific examples in the electronic supplementary material, table S2 describe and explain the general effects of increasing policy resolution, discrepancies are also apparent. There are instances where increasing the number of licence price regions provides a relatively small increase (e.g. the difference between one and two regions, or between four and nine regions; figure 1 ) and even an instance where increasing the number of licence price regions results in a decrease in overall revenue (the change between four and six licence regions; figure 1d ). These discrepancies arise because our boundaries are not necessarily in the most efficient locations, nor are the more numerous licence regions completely nested in the more simple regions. If we optimize the location of the licence boundaries, as well as the licence prices, we can observe a more rapid increase in revenues (triangle in the central panel of figure 1d ; electronic supplementary material, figure  S4 ). If we require the regions of a higher resolution scenario to be nested within lower resolution regions-by splitting larger management units-we recover the expected monotonic increases in revenue with higher resolution management (cross in central panel of figure 1d ).
We finally examine the relationship between management resolution and performance under three different models of larval dispersal: biophysical dispersal; a distance-based Gaussian kernel and self-recruitment only (figure 4). Our results indicate that more complex larval dispersal structure receives a relatively greater benefit from complex management policies. If forced to rely on a single uniform policy (i.e. the current GBRMP management), regulators are still able to capture a proportion of the first best revenue rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 283: 20152828 (i.e. simply by regulating total fishery effort). When dispersal patterns are self-recruiting, fishers are able to capture greater than 95% of the optimal revenue with only a single licence price. A well-chosen set of four licence regions can capture more than 98% of the optimal revenue in this self-recruiting scenario, which in practice would be difficult to distinguish from the optimal revenue. When dispersal creates demographic connections between populations on different reefs, spatial differentiation in licence prices becomes more important. For Gaussian and biophysical dispersal, a single licence can capture 93% and 94% of the optimal revenue, respectively-less than for the self-recruiting scenario, and also surprisingly similar to each other.
We can interpret figure 4 as a decomposition of the ecological and economic heterogeneity in the coral trout fishery. Consider the performance of a single licence price in each of the three dispersal models, where the regulator is able to control the total amount of effort applied to the system, but not where that effort is applied. Under the self-recruiting model of dispersal, the only difference between the reefs is economic, specifically the variable cost of travelling to the reefs. Failing to capture this heterogeneity creates a suboptimality (4%). Including biophysical dispersal makes effort control alone less effective (6%), indicating that dispersal makes it more important to regulate where effort is applied, not simply the total amount of effort. However, a comparable amount of suboptimality (7%) is present when dispersal is simply based on the distance between reefs (Gaussian). Thus, the primary influence of dispersal on the optimal distribution of effort probably reflects simple geometric properties of the reef system: the density of reefs or their relative size. The full complexity of larval dispersal patterns-the asymmetric source-sink connections and the complex hydrodynamics of the GBR lagoon-have a very small impact on the performance of effort management, both for a single licence price and for more spatially complex policies.
Discussion
Using a bioeconomic model of a commercial fishery on the GBRMP in Australia, we have shown how the gross performance of a fishery (i.e. total revenues) will improve with more spatially resolved management policies. Spatially resolved management policies can yield substantial benefits: revenue increases by 6% between the least resolved policy and the first best solution. Our results therefore confirm theoretical expectations about the relationship between management resolution and fishery performance [12, 16] . They also mirror a broader range of studies that link spatial resolution to performance in the regulation of water and air pollutants, when comparing nationally uniform and regionally differentiated environmental policies [10, 42] . The same underlying process influences the heterogeneity of compensation payments and the provision of ecosystem services [43] ; and the resolution of protected areas and the effectiveness of systematic conservation planning [44] .
However, our results also indirectly reveal the limitations of spatially heterogeneous policies. The greater part of the revenue captured by the first best policy resolution can be achieved with a single licence price-that is, simply by imposing an access price on the fishery (effectively, pricing and limiting access to the resource). One-sixth of the remaining revenue can be achieved with four licence regions (figure 1d), with additional resolution yielding very small improvement. Our analyses cannot identify the optimal resolution of management; this will be a balance between the revenue generated by a particular policy and the transaction costs of implementing it [10] , as well as the size and structure of governance and institutions [41, 45] . We do not estimate these counterbalancing factors. However, the concave relationship between resolution and revenue suggests that optimal resolution will be much closer to a single licence region, than to the first best. The increases in revenue that result from moving from nine to 30 licence regions appear insufficient to compensate for the increase in implementation costs that would result from implementing such complex policies, informing fishers and enforcing compliance. With rapidly diminishing returns, first best harvest policies are almost certainly inefficient. However, an interesting extension would be to explore the possible efficiency gains from combining two policy instruments that deal with spatial variation at different resolutions-large licence price regions, combined with no-take marine protected areas on individual reefs-given that the latter have proven effective in the GBRMP.
By repeating the analyses with three different larval dispersal models, our results additionally suggest that high-resolution ecological processes may not justify high-resolution policies. As dispersal becomes more complex, the relative performance of the most complex policy increases (figure 4). This pattern recreates at a seascape scale the results of simpler, theoretical models [16, 25] , which show that more asymmetric and complex larval dispersal patterns benefit from more variable management policies. Larval dispersal creates environmental externalities, and asymmetric externalities generally present more difficult management and enforcement problems [11] . When dispersal is only self-recruiting, there are no sources or sinks, and therefore less need for high-resolution policies. By contrast, both Gaussian and biophysical dispersal are highly asymmetric. In Gaussian dispersal, sources and sinks exist because larger reefs export more larvae, and because regions with high densities of patches will generate large populations and larval export through mutual demographic reinforcement. Biophysical larval dispersal is complex and structured at a range of scales, creating source-sink pairs through locally asymmetric dispersal, and regional-scale sources and sinks via the influence of large-scale oceanographic and geomorphological structure. These models of dispersal consequently have a greater need for highly resolved management policies, but the magnitude of the improvement is small relative to the additional effort and cost needed to describe the dynamics of larval dispersal patterns.
Although increasing the resolution of management generally enables higher revenues, the rate at which performance increases with resolution is not uniform. Higher resolution management creates the greatest increase in performance when the boundaries of new regions match underlying ecological or economic differences [46] . For example, moving to four regions creates a much larger increase in revenue than moving from one region to two ( figures 1 and 4) . This is because variation in travel costs-a primary source of heterogeneity in our model-is better captured by the four regions than by the two. The northern and southern halves of the GBRMP, despite their different appearance, have almost identical distributions of distance to the nearest port (and therefore transport costs). They therefore attract approximately the same rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 283: 20152828 licence price (figure 2), negating the benefits of being allowed to set an additional licence price. By contrast, the four management regions have very different average distances to port (electronic supplementary material, figure S2), and different licence prices allow managers to better match variation in the fishery (figure 1). Were travel costs much lower, the fishery would be more profitable overall, but the case for more spatially resolved management would be even weaker, since cheaper travel reduces economic heterogeneity.
Not only are increases in performance of variable size, performance can actually decrease when management resolution increases-even when licence prices are chosen optimally-if the location of the boundary changes as well (from four to six regions in figure 1 ). More numerous licence regions only improve the fishery's performance if they allow managers to better reflect the underlying environmental heterogeneity. Choosing appropriate locations for policy boundaries is therefore important (electronic supplementary material, figure S4 ), and parallels efforts by fishery scientists to identify meaningful spatial population units to reflect in stock assessments [20] . In essence, it is not increased resolution per se that improves performance, it is the match (or mismatch) between the management resolution and the heterogeneity of the socioecological system [25, 45, 46] . Management inefficiencies may therefore be unavoidable when policy regions are determined by inflexible social and political boundaries, such as those found in many coastal coral reef ecosystems [41] .
Our analyses make a series of simplifying economic and ecological assumptions. From an economic perspective, we assume that the fishers have perfect information about the state of the system-specifically stock density on each reef, the cost of catching fish and the price they can obtain for them. We also assume free vessel movement between the different ports in the region, and into and out of the fishery itself. The accuracy of these economic assumptions will vary; for example, we know that vessels tend not to exit the coral trout fishery when profits decline, but that they are willing to relocate within the GBRMP in response to changes in fish densities [47] . From an ecological perspective, a primary simplification of the model is its lack of temporal variation and stochasticity. Dispersal is known to be highly temporally variable, and the coral trout fishery is highly impacted by stochastic weather disturbances-chiefly cyclones and outflow pulses of sediment and freshwater [48] . However, we were forced to accept some ecological simplifications to reduce the computational burden of optimizing over 1794 control variables in the first best solution. We ran additional analyses, applying our optimal licence policies to a metapopulation with annually varying dispersal, and found that the general trend of our results was still apparent (electronic supplementary material, Methods 4 and figure S3 ). The optimal temporal scale of policy adjustment is directly analogous to our analyses: bioeconomic systems vary in time as well as in space, and managers must therefore choose a temporal resolution for their policies, as well as a spatial resolution [49] . Despite these simplifying assumptions, the purpose of these two model componentsecological and economic-was to model a dynamic fishery that was driven by multiple, distinct forms of heterogeneity. The signal of these different heterogeneities was apparent in our results, and this allowed us to investigate their consequences, even if we did not perfectly recreate their dynamics.
Ecosystems are variable, and generally speaking, ecologists argue that the ideal response to this heterogeneity is policies that can match and manipulate the scale of that variation [10, 43, 45, 46] . By investigating this phenomenon using a biophysical model of a coral reef fishery, our results reinforce this perspective, and particularly illustrate how complex ecological processes, such as dispersal, enhance the benefits offered by high-resolution policies. However, although increasing resolution can deliver a monotonic increase in management revenue, the returns diminish very rapidly once there are more than a half-dozen management zones across the whole GBRMP. Management policies that match the scale of ecological and economic variation will improve the performance of management policies, but they will also increase administrative and compliance costs, for both management and fishers. As a result, while current management policies for the coral trout on the GBRMP vary at a much lower resolution than the underlying ecological and economic variation, the majority of potential benefits could probably be realized by a relative small increase in the spatial complexity of management.
